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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:  
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear here today to discuss issues 
associated with the restructuring of U.S. electricity industry and FERC’s role in guiding 
the development of efficient competitive wholesale electricity markets.  I last appeared 
before this Committee on June 13, 2001 as a participant in a hearing that focused on 
California’s electricity crisis, FERC’s responses to it, and more generally on the state of 
restructuring and competition in the electric power industry.2  I thought that it would be 
most useful for me to update the comments and observations I made at that time in light 
of 18 months of additional experience. 
A lot has happened in 18 short months.  The extraordinarily high wholesale 
electricity market prices and power supply emergencies that plagued California and the 
rest of the West during the second half of 2000 and the first several months of 2001 
subsided by the summer of 2001 and these extraordinary conditions have not reappeared 
since then.  These changes in market performance followed several actions by federal and 
state officials that constrained wholesale prices, increased supplies of and reduced the 
                                                 
1 Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
and Director of the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.  The views expressed here 
are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of MIT or any other organizations with which I am 
affiliated.  A CV with my educational background, affiliations and a list of my publications can be obtained 
at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/pjoskow/index.htm. 
 
2 Statement of Paul L. Joskow Before the Committee on Government Affairs of the United States Senate, 
June 13, 2001 available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/pjoskow/files/JOSKOWSENATEFINAL.PDF. 
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demand for electricity, along with favorable weather conditions and a significant 
softening in natural gas prices.  However, the impacts of the crisis continue to be felt.  
Retail electricity prices have increased dramatically (on average) in California to cover 
the costs of power supplies purchased during the crisis, while its two major utilities have 
yet to regain investment grade credit ratings and one remains in bankruptcy.  The future 
structure and performance of California’s electricity industry remains uncertain. 
In October 2001, Enron announced that it had to restate its earnings due to 
accounting irregularities and within a few short months it was bankrupt.  Earnings 
restatements, additional accounting irregularities, sham round-trip energy transactions, 
abusive self-dealing arrangements and evidence of efforts to manipulate market prices 
during the California electricity crisis were subsequently revealed at Enron and other 
energy trading and merchant generating companies.  The financial rating agencies 
downgraded the credit ratings of many energy firms to “junk” levels in response to new 
information about the quality of reported earnings, falling profits and profit forecasts, and 
a new understanding of the true risks associated with energy trading and investments in 
merchant generating capacity.  The share prices for many energy trading and merchant 
generating companies tumbled and capital markets have largely closed to them.  A 
growing number of companies have withdrawn from energy trading or scaled back their 
activities, wholesale market liquidity has declined and an enormous amount of new 
generating capacity that was under construction, development or planned to come on line 
over the next few years has been cancelled or indefinitely delayed.  Investment in 
transmission infrastructure has continued to stagnate and congestion problems continue to 
grow.      
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In response to these events, public and investor confidence in competitive 
electricity markets has been shaken, and several states that had planned to introduce 
restructuring, wholesale and retail competition initiatives have delayed or suspended 
these programs.  Numerous investigations by federal and state agencies have been 
initiated, indictments and criminal convictions are growing.   
 The developments in electricity markets and regulation over the last 18 months 
have inevitably become intertwined with revelations of broader corporate accounting, 
financial reporting, and related abuses by several large companies, their senior 
executives, their auditors, and their bankers both within and outside the electricity and 
gas industries--- Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, etc.  These revelations should remind us that 
certain types of regulatory rules and effective regulatory oversight, as well as clear and 
accurate disclosure of relevant accounting and financial information, are necessary for 
market economies to work effectively for consumers and investors.  Clearly, the system 
of checks and balances that we have relied upon to police and mitigate such abuses failed 
to work effectively in these cases.  However, it has been my experience that the vast 
majority of energy companies play by the rules, file accurate financial reports, have 
diligent internal and external auditors, have Boards that provide effective oversight, care 
about their customers and their communities, and run their businesses with high ethical 
standards.  As we learn from recent experience, tighten regulatory rules and oversight, 
and seek to restore the confidence of the general public and investors it is important to 
keep this in mind. 
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What have we learned over the past 18 months about the initiatives to create 
competitive wholesale and retail electricity market in the United States?  My list of 
important lessons learned is as follows: 
• Creating well functioning competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets is a 
significant technical and institutional challenge.  It is easy to do it badly!  We still 
have much to learn about how to make these markets work well and we must 
expect that there will be a process of (hopefully) continuing improvement.  
Careful attention to the details of electricity market design, drawing on both U.S. 
and international experience, and active involvement by federal and state 
regulators in defining and implementing these details is very important. 
 
• Electricity’s unusual attributes also create unusual opportunities to exercise 
market power and to engage in behavior to raise market prices to supra-
competitive levels either unilaterally or through tacit coordination.   
 
• The creation of sound electricity market structures and good market rules can 
reduce firms’ incentives and ability to exercise market power, withhold output, 
violate market rules, and drive up market prices.  It is important that the 
restructuring process continue to create the necessary market structures and rules 
to support effective competition and reduce incentives to engage in behavior that 
harms consumers.    
• A well designed market and associated market rules, however, is not enough to 
ensure that there will be no serious market abuses.  An effective, credible and 
professional market monitoring system must be in place to measure and evaluate 
market performance, to identify actions necessary to improve market performance 
where it is poor, to enforce the market rules, and to punish those who violate 
them.  These monitoring and enforcement systems should be insulated as much as 
is reasonably possible from interest group politics.  More public transparency and 
more public disclosure of market and financial information are necessary in a 
competitive electricity industry than a regulated electricity industry, just the 
opposite of the trend that emerged during the recent past.  The public, their 
elected representatives, and investors have lost confidence in the credibility of 
competitive electricity markets over the last 18 months.  Unless the credibility of 
the markets and market participants is restored, and efforts made to disclose more 
information and analysis to the marketplace to facilitate the restoration of their 
credibility, it is unlikely that there will be support for extending electricity 
restructuring and competition initiatives to additional states.    
 
• At the same time, it is important to guard against unnecessary and ineffective 
regulatory initiatives that undermine the behavior and performance of well 
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functioning competitive markets.  Hard competition is to be encouraged while 
unfair competition, unreasonable levels of market power, and misleading or 
fraudulent presentations of financial and market information are mitigated by 
effective monitoring and appropriate sanctions.  Finding the right balance 
continues to be an important challenge.  I believe that the best approach is (a) to 
put good market designs and associated market rules in place at the outset, (b) to 
monitor and enforce compliance with these market rules, (c) to monitor and 
measure market performance on a continuing basis, (d) to identify sources of poor 
market performance where it has been found, and (e) to implement mitigation 
measures in response to poor market performance.  Going forward, I would like to 
see more emphasis on ongoing measurement of market performance and 
responding quickly to serious performance failures before they do serious damage 
and less emphasis on micromanagement of individual firm behavior and delayed 
ex post investigations of behavior after it has run its course and harmed 
consumers.  
• Much more attention needs to be paid to the development of an active demand 
side in wholesale and retail electricity markets that enables and encourages 
consumers who can respond to short term swings in market prices to do so.  In 
most markets for goods and services consumers can and do protect themselves 
from unreasonable prices by buying less.  While demand response opportunities 
for electricity may be less than for many other products, there is some underlying 
demand elasticity, and allowing it to be revealed in wholesale markets will help to 
improve market performance. 
 
• The retail competition programs in those states that have adopted them are not 
working well for residential and small commercial customers.  The deficiencies in 
retail competition programs will have adverse effects on the performance of 
wholesale markets as well.  States need to bite the bullet on retail competition for 
residential and small commercial customers.  They should either do what is 
necessary to make retail competition work well or abandon the effort and turn to a 
wholesale competition model in which distribution companies take on the 
obligation to serve smaller customers with appropriate compensation and 
incentive regulatory mechanisms in place. A retail procurement/competition 
framework that is characterized by both short-term contracts and little spot 
demand response will enhance market power problems and may undermine timely 
and efficient investment. 
 
• Electricity policy needs to pay more attention to longer-term investment issues. 
About 100,000 Mw of new generating capacity has been completed in the U.S. in 
the last two and one-half years, most of it merchant generating capacity.  This 
represents the primary success of the wholesale electric competition initiative to 
date.  Indeed, many regions now find themselves with excess generating capacity 
and consumers are benefiting from lower wholesale prices that accompany it.  
However, a large quantity of generating capacity under construction and 
development has been cancelled or indefinitely delayed in the last 18 months.   
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The pipeline of generating capacity under construction will soon be empty and it 
will take years to refill it once projects begin to be planned and built once again.  
Many of the cancellations and deferrals reflect a natural and healthy response to 
changing supply and demand conditions.  But some of them also reflect the 
turmoil in the merchant generating sector and uncertainties about future federal 
and state policies regarding market structure, market rules, market monitoring and 
mitigation, supply obligations and compensation rules.  We must anticipate that 
significant additional investment in merchant generating capacity will not take 
place until credit is restored to the sector (on both the supply and purchasing 
sides), until uncertainties about market structure and market rules are resolved, 
and until a sound stable framework for encouraging investment is established.   
This framework must recognize that future investments in generating capacity 
will involve higher financing costs and more risk management requirements than 
was the case during the most recent building boom.   
 
• More broadly, we must adopt policies to support the future evolution to an 
industry structure where merchant generators make most of their money by 
building and operating power plants cheaply and reliably and selling most of their 
output under longer term contracts to financial intermediaries and load serving 
entities. We want to design the markets so that firms earn profits by being the 
least cost suppliers, rather than by being good at engaging in behavior to increase 
price spikes in the spot market. 
 
• Well functioning competitive power markets require a more robust transmission 
systems than we had under with vertically integrated regulated monopolies.  Yet 
transmission investment continues to stagnate as congestion problems increase.  
In some parts of the country, reliability problems are growing, not because there 
is inadequate generating capacity in the region, but because there is inadequate 
transmission capacity to deliver it where it is needed.  More transmission 
congestion increases local market power problems which in turn triggers the need 
for more regulatory interventions which may simultaneously undermine 
investment incentives.   If we are not successful in adopting policies that stimulate 
more investment in transmission capacity to support competitive electricity 
markets we will face very serious electricity reliability and local market power 
problems in many parts of the U.S. within a few years.  
  
• The absence of a coherent national policy governing electricity sector 
restructuring, wholesale and retail competition, and effective market monitoring 
and enforcement, supported by compatible federal legislation, is a serious 
impediment to achieving good performance for the sector.  Wholesale electricity 
markets naturally span large regions of the country that encompass many states.  
Decisions made in one state affect electricity prices, supplies, and reliability in 
other states in the region.  The conflicts between policies and perspectives about 
the costs and benefits of electricity sector restructuring and competition among 
the states substantially increases the difficulties FERC faces in enforcing its 
responsibilities under the Federal Power Act.  The lack of clear national policy 
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mandates no doubt reflects the lack of consensus about the merits of industry 
restructuring and competition and how best to get from here to there.  However, at 
the very least, FERC and the states must have a constructive cooperative working 
relationship that reflects a common set of performance goals.  Moreover, at least 
in the Northeast, there is a broad commitment to wholesale and retail competition 
and a reasonable amount of agreement about how to move forward with it.  It is 
important that controversies elsewhere in the country not slow down the efforts by 
the states, market participants, and ISOs in the Northeast to continue to make 
constructive reforms. 
Let me now turn to a brief assessment of how FERC has responded to the lessons 
learned over the last 18 months.  In my June 13, 2001 testimony I was critical of FERC’s 
responses to the California electricity crisis: 
 “It should not have taken FERC so long to evaluate the performance of 
California’s markets when they exploded during summer 2000…”  
 
“I was especially disappointed by FERC’s response to abundant evidence that 
market power problems were exacerbating an already bad situation caused by 
rising natural gas prices, reduced imports of power, higher demand and rising 
prices for NOx emissions permits.”   
 
“There is a very basic problem here.  FERC does not appear to have a clear 
definition of market power, has not identified the empirical indicia it will use to 
measure the presence and extent of market power, does not routinely collect or 
analyze the data necessary to draw conclusions about market power, has not 
defined how much market power is too much market power to satisfy its 
obligations to ensure that wholesale electricity prices are just and reasonable, and 
it does not appear to have a well developed set of mitigation measures that it can 
choose from if it indeed finds that there is a significant market power problem.  
This is not a prescription for success in the identification of and effective response 
to serious market power problems.”  
 
 “By delaying its analysis of the problem, by failing to specify a clear definition of 
market power, by failing to specify or apply clear numerical criteria for evaluating 
market performance generally, and by ignoring constructive comprehensive 
proposals for mitigation, FERC did not in my opinion properly fulfill its 
responsibilities to respond to the California’s market meltdown adequately or in a 
timely fashion.”3 
                                                 
3 I also indicated that “It is not my intention to place all of the blame on FERC for prolonging or 
exacerbating the crisis.  There is plenty of blame to go around and policy makers have spent too much time 
looking for parties to blame and too little time fixing the problems.  The CPUC’s slow reaction to the 
problems, its failure to increase retail prices, the ensuing utility credit problems, and the legitimate 
reluctance of suppliers to supply without some assurance of getting paid certainly worsened the underlying 
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“If FERC is successfully to perform on its obligations it will have to change as 
well.  FERC needs to become an agency with the human resources, organizational 
structure, administrative procedures and leadership that allows it to play an active 
constructive role in guiding resolution of wholesale market design issues, to be 
actively involved in ongoing monitoring of market performance, to develop and 
effectively apply objective market performance indicia, and to act quickly and 
cooperatively with the relevant state agencies, Independent System Operators, 
Regional Transmission Organizations, and market participants to fix serious 
market performance problems quickly once they have been diagnosed.  FERC 
must also play a more active role in creating new organizational structures and 
regulatory institutions to govern the nation’s currently balkanized transmission 
system.” 
 
 I believe that FERC has made a lot of progress in the last 18 months under 
Chairman Patrick Wood’s leadership and has responded positively to the criticisms that I 
made in mid-2001.   While I do not necessarily agree with everything FERC has done or 
proposes to do, I am generally pleased with the tone that has now been set at the top, the 
institutions that have been created to monitor electricity and gas markets, and with the 
electricity market reform initiatives that have been undertaken.  The Chairman and the 
other FERC Commissioners have repeatedly made it clear to market participants that they 
are committed to creating well functioning competitive wholesale markets and that they 
will not tolerate efforts to manipulate market prices, violate market rules, engage in fraud, 
and other market abuses.  The FERC Commissioners now appear to recognize that 
market power, price manipulation and fraud are real potential problems in electricity and 
gas markets, that serious market aberrations require serious investigation, that if a careful 
and professional investigation results in evidence of abuse, penalties will be assessed 
where appropriate, and that FERC must play a central role in responsibly monitoring 
                                                                                                                                                 
wholesale market problems.  The failure of FERC and the CPUC to find a way to work together 
constructively to find practical solutions in the early Fall of 2000 made the crisis much worse than 
necessary.” 
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markets and responding quickly to serious problems in order to restore credibility to 
wholesale electricity markets and to improve their performance.   
    In April, 2002 FERC created a new Office of Market Oversight and 
Investigations.  The new Office is to “ … help the Commission improve its understanding 
of energy market operations and ensure vigilant and fair oversight of those areas under 
Commission jurisdiction.  The Office of Market Oversight and Investigations will 
oversee and assess the operations of the nation's gas, oil pipeline, and electricity markets. 
Its functions will include understanding energy markets and risk management, measuring 
market performance, investigating compliance violations, and analyzing market data.  
The office will be made up of a multi-disciplinary team of economists, engineers, 
attorneys, auditors, data management specialists, financial analysts, regulatory policy 
analysts, energy analysts, and support staff.”4   
I have been arguing for some time that there was the need for an office of this 
type to be created within FERC.  I am very pleased that an office with a professional staff 
dedicated to measuring market performance, market monitoring and investigation has 
now been created.  There is still much work to be done in defining how market 
performance will be measured, what criteria will be used for monitoring market behavior, 
and what mitigation measures will be proposed and how they will be received by the 
Commission.  However, the Office seems to be off to a good start, is reaching out to 
others with experience with these issues for suggestions for how it can best do its work, 5 




5 I participated in the Technical Conference on market monitoring issues held by FERC Staff on October 2, 
2002.  http://www.ferc.fed.us/Electric/RTO/Mrkt-Strct-comments/nopr/RM01-12omoi-09-20-02.pdf.  The 
Staff received a range of views regarding methods and metrics for measuring market structure, performance 
and participant behavior. 
 10 
and improving coordination with market monitoring units in the three ISOs in the 
Northeast and the California ISO. 
 The Commission has also launched a number of investigations growing out of the 
California electricity crisis.  In February, 2002 FERC initiated an investigation of gas and 
electricity markets in the West prior to and during the explosion in electricity and natural 
gas prices that accompanied the California electricity crisis, largely stimulated by 
revelations about Enron’s behavior.6  The investigation has been broad, aggressive and 
has sought help by outside experts to assist with it.7   It is being coordinated with other 
agencies, including the Department of Justice, the SEC and the CFTC.  An interim Staff 
report was issued in August 2002 which found evidence of violations by Enron and 
possibly other market participants of the letter or the spirit of market rules, resulting in 
higher electricity prices, along with actions aimed at inflating prices and trading volumes 
for natural gas and electricity reported to and by trade publications.8  (The efforts to 
inflate prices reported to trade publications would only have made sense if this behavior 
in turn led to higher actual prices in spot or forward markets, though the FERC Staff has 
made no finding yet on these effects.)  Indeed, perhaps for the first time, the Staff 
concluded that certain behavior represented the exercise of market power and not just the 
result of flawed or inconsistent market rules.9  A number of other investigations and 
litigated cases are ongoing, including the California refund cases, the El Paso Pipeline 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6 http://www.ferc.fed.us/electric/bulkpower/pa02-2/02-13-02.pdf . 
 
7 http://www.ferc.fed.us/electric/bulkpower/pa02-2/pa02-2.htm . 
 
8 http://www.ferc.fed.us/electric/bulkpower/pa02-2/Initial-Report-PA02-2-000.pdf . 
 
9 Staff Report, ibid. at  page 94; “This behavior (raising prices and the last minute where buyers are unable 
or incapable of saying no) was not legitimate arbitrage, but was an exercise of market power.” 
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investigation,10 abusive self-dealing transactions between Enron’s regulated and 
unregulated affiliates.   
Ultimately, FERC’s effectiveness and credibility as both a market facilitator and a 
complementary market monitor will depend on its ability to establish rules that increase 
market and regulatory transparency, to complete ongoing investigations in a way that 
demonstrates that it will carefully, completely and professionally evaluate the evidence, 
assess penalties if serious abuses are found, exonerate market participants under 
investigation if they are not, and complete the investigations as quickly as is reasonably 
possible. 
In Order No. 2001 (April, 2002), FERC established rules that require detailed 
reporting on transactions within the electric energy and natural gas markets.  These new 
rules should increase market transparency and facilitate more effective monitoring of 
these markets by FERC and the public.   
 Finally, on July 31, 2002, FERC issued its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 
Standard Market Design and Structure (SMD).11  This is a sweeping rulemaking that 
attempts to deal with many of the problems with wholesale markets that have been 
identified, including effects to respond to many of the “lessons learned” discussed earlier 
in my testimony.  I recognize that many of the proposals in the SMD are controversial. 
And while I agree with many of them, I also believe that there are several aspects of the 
SMD NOPR that need significant improvement and revision.  Nevertheless, this is a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 http://www.ferc.fed.us/electric/bulkpower/RP00-241-006-09-23-02.pdf . 
 




serious, even courageous effort by FERC to facilitate wholesale market competition and 
improve market performance.  Market monitoring and mitigation proposals are fully 
integrated into the SMD and the potential for exercising market power and the need to 
mitigate it has influenced important aspects of the proposals.    
FERC has wisely extended the time period for filing comments on the SMD 
NOPR and has initiated various outreach efforts to better explain certain aspects of the 
SMD proposals and to receive advice from interested parties about problems with the 
SMD and potential improvements to its proposals.12  Because there are wide variations 
among states and regions in how deeply they have embraced FERC’s vision of wholesale 
and retail electricity competition, and how far they have moved down the restructuring 
path, it is likely that the SMD’s basic principles for wholesale market structure will have 
to be adapted to better match these regional differences.  The alternative appears to be 
political gridlock and substantial delays.  As I have already noted, it would be 
unfortunate, for example, if the controversies over the SMD, slowed down reforms taking 
place in the Northeast where most of the states have embraced FERC’s vision for 
wholesale and retail electricity competition and where the better features of the SMD are 
already being implemented.   
 Overall, I believe that FERC is doing a much better job today as both a market 
facilitator and a market monitor than it was doing at the height of the California 
electricity crisis.   The Commission’s efforts to facilitate fair competition in wholesale 
power markets, to improve market performance and to identify and mitigate market 
abuses deserve your support.  One does not have to agree with all of FERC’s decisions 
                                                 
12 http://www.ferc.fed.us/Electric/RTO/Mrkt-Strct-comments/discussion_paper.htm. As of October 20, 
2002. 
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and policy proposals to recognize that this is an agency whose leadership now recognizes 
that a credible market monitoring and enforcement program is an important part of its job 
and that it is necessary for facilitating the development of competitive electricity markets 
that work well.  However, institutional cultures can take a long time to change, and only 
time will tell whether this view at the top has been fully institutionalized within the 
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